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THE JURISDICTION OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION TO REGULATE TOBACCO
PRODUCTS UNDER THE FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT: Food and Drug Administration v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation et al.
Alison J. Lezak*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than 400,000 people die prematurely each year from
illnesses related to tobacco use.' In 1996, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) claimed the authority to regulate tobacco
products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or Act)
after having denied such power since the agency's creation in 1938.2
The FDA found that reducing tobacco use by minors would
considerably reduce addiction and, thus, incidence of tobacco-related
illness and death, since most tobacco consumers begin use before the
age of eighteen.3
Accordingly, the FDA created regulations regarding tobacco
products' promotion, labeling, and accessibility to minors pursuant
to its power under 21 U.S.C § 360j(e) to regulate "restricted
devices."4  The FDA found that nicotine is a "drug" and that
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are "drug delivery devices" within
*Second year law student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1298 (2000),
affirming 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
'Brown, 120 S.Ct. 1296-97. The FDCA gives the FDA jurisdiction to regulate
"drugs," which includes "articles intended to affect the structure or any function of the body,"
and "devices." 21 U.S.C. §321. "Devices" are defined, in pertinent part, as 'an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance... or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, .... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.'
3 d. at 1297.
4Id. at 1299. 21 U.S.C. §360j(e) provides, in pertinent part, that the FDA may
"require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use... upon such other conditions as
[the FDA] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful effect
or the collateral measures necessary to its use, [the agency] determines that there cannot
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness." Id. at 18. Because the
regulations related to the sale or distribution of tobacco products and were necessary for
providing a reasonable assurance of safety, the agency determined that its regulations fell under
§ 360j(e).
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the definitions of the FDCA1 Therefore, the agency claimed that,
under the FDCA, it had the authority to regulate tobacco products as
customarily marketed absent manufacturer claims of therapeutic
benefit.6
Generally, a court defers to an administrative agency's
interpretation of the statutes administered by the agency; however, an
agency cannot employ its authority in a way that conflicts with the
administrative scheme created by Congress.7 Thus, under Chevron, a
reviewing court must give effect to the unequivocal intent of
Congress.' Here, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress precluded
the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products
because such power conflicts with congressional intent as expressed
in the overall FDCA regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific
legislation enacted by Congress.'
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 11, 1995, the FDA published a proposed rule that
contained several provisions restricting the sale, distribution, and
advertisement of tobacco products. 0 On August 28, 1996, the FDA,
after receiving over 700,000 submissions during the ensuing public
comment period, issued the final rule: "Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents.""
A group composed of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and
advertisers (Respondents) brought an action challenging the FDA's
regulations in the United Stated District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina." Respondents moved for summary judgment,
contending that the FDA lacked the authority to regulate tobacco
products as customarily marketed, that the regulations exceeded the
FDA's jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. §360j(e), and that the advertising
51d. at 1300.
61d.
11d.
VId.
91d. at 1316.
'
01d.at 1297.
"Ild.
'
21d. at 1299.
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provisions violated the First Amendment. 3 The District Court denied
Respondents' motion in part, holding that the FDCA authorized the
FDA to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed and that
the FDA's access and labeling regulations were permissible.
4
However, the court also found that the regulations' advertising and
promotion restrictions exceeded the FDA's authority under §
360j(e)." The District Court, which stayed implementation of the
regulations that it found valid, certified an order for immediate
interlocutory appeal.'
6
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
held that Congress did not give the FDA the authority to regulate
tobacco products.' 7 The court considered the FDCA in its entirety
and determined that the FDA's regulation of tobacco would create
several disparities within the regulatory scheme.," The Act requires
the FDA to preclude the marketing of any "unsafe" or "dangerous"
product and, thus, the FDA would have to ban tobacco products. 9
The Court of Appeals found this result contrary to congressional
intent and concluded that this disparity showed that Congress did not
intend to grant the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco.20
Reinforcing this conclusion was evidence that the FDA
invariably disavowed jurisdiction over tobacco before 1995 and that
Congress, aware of the FDA's position, enacted tobacco-specific
legislation.' In addition, the Court reasoned that Congress had
considered and rejected many bills that would have granted the FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco and that the 1938 enacting Congress
lacked intent to subject tobacco to FDCA regulation.2 Thus, the
court found that Congress meant to withhold the power to regulate
Did
14Id'61
16Id.
17Id.
191d.
22Id.
"Id
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tobacco from the FDA.23 The Government petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.24
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether, under the FDCA, the FDA had jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products as customarily marketed.25 Under Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,26 a reviewing court, viewing the
statutory scheme in its entirety, must determine whether Congress
has specifically addressed the particular issue in controversy.27 If so,
the court must give effect to Congress' unequivocal, express intent;
if not, the court must defer to the agency's construction of the statute
if such construction is permissible.28 Here, the Supreme Court found
that Congress specifically addressed the question at issue and
prohibited the FDA from asserting the authority to regulate tobacco
products.29
A. Considering the FDCA regulatory scheme in its entirety,
Congress clearly meant to exclude tobacco products from the
jurisdiction of the FDA.
A fundamental purpose of the FDCA regulatory scheme is to
safeguard public health by ensuring that a regulated product is
reasonably safe and effective for its intended use.30 To further this
objective, the FDCA generally mandates that the FDA prohibits the
marketing of a drug or device if the product's therapeutic benefit
does not outweigh the potential risk of harm to the consumer.' The
231d. at 1299-1300. The Court of Appeals did not address the issues of whether
the regulations exceeded the FDA's authority under 21 U.S.C. §360j(e) or whether they
violated the First Amendment.
241d. at 1300.25id
"26Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 81 L.Ed. 2d 694,
104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
27See Brown, 120 S.Ct. 1297, 1300.281d.
29 d. at 1301.
301d.
3lid.
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FDA determined that, although tobacco products may effectively
deliver pharmacological effects, such products are "unsafe" and
"dangerous" when used for their intended purposes." Thus, if
tobacco products constituted "devices" within the meaning of the
FDCA, the FDA would have to ban such products.33
First, the Supreme Court found that the FDA would be
required to ban tobacco products because such products constitute
misbranded devices under two FDCA provisions.34 Tobacco
products are misbranded under §352(j) because they are "dangerous
to health" when used as directed."3  Next, the Supreme Court
concluded that no directions exist that could make tobacco safe for
its intended use and, thus, tobacco products would constitute
misbranded devices under §352(f)(1), prohibited from entering
interstate commerce under the Act.36
Second, under the FDCA, the FDA would have to place
tobacco products in the Class III category because they constitute a
"potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and, thus, the FDA
would have to ban tobacco. 37 The FDA argued that tobacco products
are "safe" under the Act, because a ban would likely be "dangerous"
due to the high level of consumer addiction.38 However, under the
Act, the likely therapeutic benefits of the product must outweigh the
risk of harm for a product to be "safe" and, thus, the FDA did not
find that tobacco products are "safe" under the FDCA.39 Therefore,
the Supreme Court found that the Act would require the FDA to ban
tobacco products under both the misbranding and device
321d. at 1302.
33Id
34Id. 21 U.S.C. §331(a) prohibits "the introduction or delivery for introduction
into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adultered or
misbranded."
3 Id Under FDCA §352(j) a product is misbranded "if it is dangerous to health
when used in the dosage or manner, or with the frequency or duration prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof."361d. Under FDCA §352(f)(1), a product is misbranded "unless its labeling
bears... adequate directions for use... in such manner and form, as are necessary for the
protection of the public health."
"Id. The FDA must put all regulated products into one of three categories, which
determines the degree of regulation required to ensure reasonable safety and effectiveness;
the FDA has yet to classify tobacco products.38Id. at 1304.
39Id. at 1305.
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classification provisions because it would be impossible to show
such products are safe for their intended use.4 °
However, Congress precluded the removal of tobacco
products from the market.4 Since 1965, Congress has directly
spoken to the issue of tobacco and health by enacting six separate
statutes." Rather than ordering a tobacco ban, Congress has
regulated tobacco products in accordance with its policy of
protecting "commerce and the national economy.. .to the maximum
extent consistent with" consumers "being adequately informed about
any adverse health effects." 43 Therefore, the Court concluded that
Congress intends that tobacco products remain on the market and,
thus, a FDA ban on tobacco would clearly contravene congressional
intent."
Next, the Supreme Court found that the FDA's construction
of "safety" was implausible.45 Under the Act, the FDA must weigh a
product's potential therapeutic benefit to the consumer against the
likely risk of injury.46 However, the FDA's conception of safety
requires that consumers' continued tobacco use, the very problem
that the FDA seeks to rectify, constitute a "probable benefit to
health. 4 7 The Supreme Court also ruled that the FDA's conception
of safety conflicts with the Act's misbranding provision, which
focuses on dangers to the consumer from using the product. 4 Thus, a
product could be dangerous to the health of consumers when used as
directed even if banning the product may harm the collective public
health.49
Finally, the Court found that, under the FDCA, the FDA can
40Id. at1302-3.41Id. at 1303.
42 Id.
431d. at 1304.
"Id.
41Id. at 1305.
"Id. Under §360c(a)(2), "the safety and effectiveness of a device are to be
determined (A) with respect to the persons for whose use the device is represented or
intended, (B) with respect to the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling of the device, and (C) weighing any probably benefit to health from the use
of the device against any probably risk of injury or illness from such use."
47 Id.
4, Id.
49 1d.
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regulate "dangerous" products without prohibiting them." However,
the FDA cannot deem a product unsafe for any therapeutic purpose
and still permit that product to stay on the market because such
action conflicts with the Act's basic goal of ensuring that every
product is safe and effective.5 Therefore, viewing the FDCA in its
entirety, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress clearly meant to
exclude tobacco products from the authority of the FDA."
B. Congress has ratified the FDA's long-held position that the
FDA does not have any jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products.
The Supreme Court held that Congress' actions constitute an
effective ratification of the FDA's position that it lacked jurisdiction
to regulate tobacco.3 Congress enacted six tobacco-specific statutes
since 1965 in the context of the FDA's constant statements that,
under the FDCA, it did not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
absent manufacturer claims of therapeutic benefit."4 Moreover,
Congress explicitly preempted any other regulation of cigarette
labeling by adopting the FCLAA.11 FDA tobacco regulation conflicts
with the FCLAA because the FDCA requires the FDA to regulate
drug and device labeling, a factor that shows Congress' intent to
adopt a regulatory scheme that precludes any administrative agency
from regulating tobacco.3 '
In addition, while the FDA continued to disavow jurisdiction
over tobacco, Congress adopted additional tobacco-specific
legislation, which gradually extended the scope of its distinct
tobacco regulatory scheme and proved that Congress intends to
3IM at 1305-6.
"Id at 1306.
52Id.
"Id at 1313.
I3 d at 1306-7.
"Id. at 1309. The FCLAA regulatory scheme created a 'comprehensive Federal
program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health.' Id. at 50-51. Its purpose was to balance the objectives of
ensuring that the public is aware of the health hazards associated with cigarette smoking
and protecting "commerce and the national economy... to the maximum extent."
36Id. at 1306-9.
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reserve to itself the regulation of tobacco. 7 Furthermore, Congress,
well aware of the health and pharmacological effects of tobacco use,
contemplated and rejected several proposals that would have given
the FDA the power to regulate tobacco products.58 Thus, in effect,
Congress' tobacco regulatory scheme ratified the FDA's disavowal
of any jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products under the FDCA5
Lastly, until the FDA created the regulations at issue here, it
had explicitly disavowed the authority to regulate tobacco since its
creation in 1938.0 The FDA's former position coincided with the
intent of the 1938 enacting Congress, which never even considered
giving the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products.6' The Supreme
Court found it very unlikely that Congress implicitly intended to
subject tobacco to the FDCA considering the political and economic
importance of the tobacco industry at the time .6 Thus, the Court
held that, Congress, through its tobacco-specific legislation,
effectively ratified the FDA's clear and persistent position that, under
the FDCA, it has no authority to regulate tobacco products as
customarily marketed.63
IV. DISSENT
According to the dissent, the FDCA grants the FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco." The dissent found that tobacco
products are within the FDA's power under the Act to regulate
"drugs" and "devices" "intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body. '6 In addition, the dissent found that the Act's
purpose of protecting public health and the Act's legislative history
provide additional support for the conclusion that the FDA has the
power to regulate tobacco."
"
7Id. 1309-10.
"Id. at 1312.
59Id. at 1313.
60Id. at 1308.61 Id.
62 Id.
631d. at 1313.
'Id. at 1316. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented.
Old. at 1320.
"Id. at 1316.
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Moreover, the dissent averred that the FDA's former denial
of jurisdiction resulted mainly from the inability to prove the Act's
"intent" requirement.67 However, the FDA had since obtained
evidence that manufacturers knew about the chemical effects of
tobacco and that they wanted their products to produce such effects.6,
Thus, the dissent found that the companies "intended" their products
to "affect" the body under the FDCA.69
Furthermore, the dissent found that the FDCA does not
mandate a total ban on tobacco.70 The Act gives the FDA discretion
to choose remedies congruous with its purpose of protecting public
health and, thus, does not mandate a complete product ban if, as here,
a ban may pose more harm than other remedies. 7' In addition, the
Act's misbranding and device classification provisions allow the
FDA to consider the overall relative safety of a product." Thus, the
FDA could find that a product is comparatively "safe" if it would be
less dangerous to make the product available, subject to regulation,
than suddenly to remove it from the market.73 Likewise, the Act
requires a flexible construction that allows the FDA to consider
human behavior and allows it remedial discretion in light of
Congress' intent to protect public health.74 Therefore, the dissent,
finding that the Act does not require a ban, concluded that even if a
ban was required, the Act would curb the agency's remedial
discretion rather than its jurisdiction.75
Finally, the dissent found that the laws enacted after 1965 do
not bar the FDA's power to regulate tobacco. 6 The dissent noted that
the Court has refused to interpret the FCLAA as preempting all
tobacco regulation.77 In addition, although Congress did not
expressly grant jurisdiction to the FDA, Congress also did not
671d. at 1329.
"Id.
'Old. at 1330.
7Id. at 1323-24.
721d. at 1323-26.
71Id at 1325.
'
41d. at 1325-26.
"Id. at 1331.
76d. at 1326.
771d at 1327.
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positively revoke such power when the FDA avowed jurisdiction.7
Thus, the dissent found that the only rational interpretation of the
post-1965 legislation is that Congress did not intend these laws to
address the issue of the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. 9
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that
the FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products °
constitutes a considerable victory for tobacco manufacturers. In
effect, this decision bars any administrative agency from asserting
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. Thus, tobacco products will likely
never face extensive regulation, much less a ban, unless Congress
takes such action, which is unlikely given the adverse impact on the
national economy that restrictive regulations or a complete ban of
tobacco could cause. Likewise, the strong political influence of the
tobacco lobby in our nation's capital will also prevent restrictive
regulation of tobacco products by Congress. Therefore, tobacco
products remain subject to the less restrictive and less extensive
regulations promulgated by Congress.
In addition, given the political and economic importance of
tobacco, the policy-making decision regarding tobacco products
should be reserved for Congress. An administrative agency may be
more willing to ban tobacco products, or at least regulate such
products more strictly, because such agencies are comprised of
appointed officials. Thus, since agency officials are directly
accountable to the elected officials who appointed them, agency
officials are likely to make policy decisions primarily based on the
political preference of the appointing elected officials. However,
Congress, which is accountable to the voters, should make a decision
of such importance because the decision requires careful
consideration not only of politics but also of a host of other factors,
including economics. Congress has the vast resources and the
committees necessary to conduct the thorough investigation of
tobacco products necessary to protect the consumer and the national
78d
"Id.80 d at 1316.
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economy "to the maximum extent."'"
The case is also an important case for administrative law, for
it indicates that the first prong of the Chevron test contains bite. It
also indicates the willingness of the court to look at other, related
statutory enactments of Congress, to interpret Congressional intent.
Lastly, the case is interesting because of its view of the "mandate"
contained in FDA legislation. If the FDA was correct, it was
required to ban tobacco. Above and beyond visions of cigarette
bootlegging, the vision that the agency had no discretion short of
such a ban is an important statement about agency discretion, or the
lack thereof.
"Id. at 1304.
I
